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“We draw sustenance not only from the region but also from the international economic system 
to which we as a Global City belong and which will be the final arbiter of whether we prosper 





The current recessionary environment and general sense of pessimism in Singapore 
should in no way detract from the fact that the city state has been one of the most dynamic 
economies in the world over the past three decades, and that growth has been highly durable 
(Table 1). A milieu of factors has contributed to Singapore’s economic success. These include 
its favourable location along Southeast Asia’s major shipping and air trade routes in addition 
to having a deep natural harbour, high quality infrastructure, a stable political system, an 
efficient bureaucracy and exemplary economic management. While all these elements are of 
importance, a key ingredient of Singapore’s hitherto successful growth strategy has 
undoubtedly been its outward orientation, particularly its openness to trade and investment 
flows. Accordingly, Singapore has been a leading advocate of global trade liberalisation and 
the free flow of goods and services across international borders. Indeed, despite its 
microscopic physical size, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ranked Singapore as the tenth 
largest merchandise trading nation in the world and among the top twenty in the cross-border 
trade in commercial services (Tables 2 and 3). 
Nonetheless, pragmatically recognising its limited influence in the multilateral arena 
where recent progress on many important issues relating to trade and investment liberalisation 
seems to have been rather slow and negotiations prolonged, halting and rather unwieldy (some 
go so far as to say multilateralism has become altogether dysfunctional, Singapore has 
simultaneously pursued a second track to liberalisation via the regional route. Regionalism has 
to date involved both the Southeast Asian region via the ten-member ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) grouping and the larger Asia and Pacific region via the twenty-one 
member APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) grouping. However, indications are that 
the recent financial crisis has held up the pace if not commitment by some of the ASEAN 




economic strength; while APEC has become large and unwieldy and appears ill-equipped to 
handle substantive trade and investment liberalisation issues effectively (Ravenhill, 2000). 
Accordingly, Singapore policy makers have underscored the need to explore alternative 
liberalisation paths, i.e. third and fourth tracks. Consequently, Free Trade Arrangements 
(FTAs) have become an integral part of Singapore’s new commercial trade strategy which in 
turn is the cornerstone of the city- state’s larger international economic policy
1.  
This paper examines the reasons for and against Singapore’s attraction to the “new 
regionalism” in general and cross-regional bilateral FTAs (bilateralism for short) in particular
2. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. It is important to appreciate the 
performance of Singapore’s external trade over the years and the relative significance of the 
various trading partners in Singapore’s overall external trade. As such, by way of background, 
the next section examines some dynamics of Singapore’s global trade performance the last two 
decades as well as the country composition of the city-state’s trade. Data limitations restrict the 
analysis in this section to merchandise trade. This is indeed regretful. Continued omission of 
services trade (particularly at the bilateral level among major trading partners) and its 
liberalisation in such empirical analysis is becoming progressively more glaring in view of its 
mounting importance in global output and trade
3. Section 3 highlights the reasons for and 
further motivations behind Singapore’s drive to form a series of bilateral FTAs in general and 
with the two economic super-powers, the US and Japan, in particular. This is followed by a 
                                                           
1 Given the definition of FTAs, Jagdish Bhagwati notes that term “preferential trade arrangements” 
(PTAs) is a more apt description. As he declares of such trade arrangements (Bhagwati, 1995), they are: 
“two-faced: they embody both free trade and protection. Economists interested in the quality of public 
policy discourse should perhaps take a pledge henceforth to rename free trade areas as “preferential” 
trade areas” (p.2). We use the terms free or preferential trade “agreements”, “arrangements”, “pacts” and 
“accords” interchangeably in this paper. 
 
2 The term “regionalism” is not meant to have any geographic connotation, referring to any trade 
initiatives that are not multilateral in nature. Rather than “new regionalism”, some prefer to use the term 
“second regionalism” in contrast to the “first regionalism” of the 1950s and 1960s which involved 
mainly South-South economic integration, i.e. FTAs among developing economies as part of import 
substitution development strategies (Lawrence, 1999 and Rajan, 1995). As Lal (1993) notes, 
“historically, FTAs have been the economic policy of the uncompetitive and the foreign policy of the 
weak” (p.353). Ethier (2000) provides one of the few theoretical discussions of the new regionalism. 
 
3 For a recent general discussion of the growing importance of services trade worldwide and various 
approaches to liberalisation of trade in services, see the WTO (2001a, chapter IV: 5) and Prieto and 




discussion of the drawbacks and potential concerns of such a “go-it-alone” trade strategy in the 
penultimate section. The final section concludes with a brief discussion of the possible 
implications of the recent round of multilateral trade negotiations in Doha for Singapore’s 
pursuit of bilateral FTAs, as well as the nexus between the new regionalism and 
multilateralism. Are the two antagonistic or are there inherent synergies between them? We 
explore this question and the consequent implications for Singapore’s new commercial trade 
strategy.  
 
2.  Singapore’s Merchandise Trade Linkages 
2.1  Aggregate Trends, 1980-2001 
 
  In nominal terms, Singapore’s total merchandise trade (exports plus imports) has risen 
almost seven times from US$ 40 billion in 1980 to over US$ 270 in 2000, an annual average 
growth of 9.6 percent (Figure 1). Over the entire period, Singapore suffered negative annual 
growth rate in merchandise trade (i.e. exports plus imports) in only three years, i.e. the 
recession of 1985 and 1986 and then in 1998 during the global electronics downturn and 
ensuing East Asian financial crisis. Although Singapore recovered smartly from the 1998 
crisis, expanding by over 20 percent in 2000, it has once again been the victim of the downturn 
in the global electronics cycle as well as the general deterioration in the external environment 
(particularly the sharp slowdown in the US and continued recession in Japan). Thus, 
Singapore’s trade grew a mere 2 percent in value during January-June 2001 as opposed to a 22 
percent rise during the same period in the year 2000 (Figure 2). The situation appears to have 
markedly gotten worse in the second half of 2001, consistent with the slump in overall 
economic growth (MTI, 2001). 
  Singapore’s global merchandise exports grew at an annual average rate of 10.3 percent 
over the 1980-2000 period. The dynamics of export growth parallel those of merchandise 
trade, i.e. total exports also suffered negative growth in the mid 1980s and late 1990s, with the 
decline in export growth being much sharper in the latter case. It rebounded by 20 percent 




export performance into domestic and re-exports, we observe that the average growth of 
Singapore’s re-exports, which reflects the entrepot activity of the economy, was 11 percent 
during the 1980-2000 period. This was marginally higher than that of domestic exports (9.8 
percent). During the 1985-86 recession, the decline in re-exports was more pronounced than 
that of domestic exports; the reverse was true during the 1998 regional crisis period. 
Immediately following the regional financial crisis, while domestic exports rebounded speedily 
in 1999, re-exports still suffered negative growth. However, the rapid growth of total exports 
in 2000 was largely due to a belated but definite rebound in re-exports.  
The non-oil component of the city state’s domestic exports registered a negative 
growth of 3.2 percent in the first six months of 2001 compared to a positive growth of 11.6 
percent during the same period a year earlier. The decline in this component of exports 
dramatically intensified in the latter half of 2001 (MTI, 2001) 
It is against this background of recent disappointing trade performance that Singapore 
has attempted to aggressively source preferential accords with a number of its trading partners. 
Singapore has already established a bilateral FTA with New Zealand, and is in the process of 
negotiating ones with Japan, the US, Australia, Canada, Mexico and the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA), which consists of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Table 4 
summarises the bilateral initiatives currently being pursued by Singapore and their respective 
stages of negotiations as of December 2001. A trade arrangement with Chile is also being 
seriously contemplated, while ones with other countries, most notably, India and the European 
Union (EU), have also been seriously mentioned at various times. In view of this, it would be 
useful to briefly examine the geographical distribution of Singapore’s trade. Of what 
significance is each of these countries/regions to Singapore’s overall global merchandise 
trade? 
   
2.2  Country Composition of Singapore’s Trade, 1995 and 2000 





Figure 3 offers a snapshot of Singapore’s total exports to its major trading partners in 
1995 and 2000. Neighbouring Malaysia is currently the single largest export destination, 
accounting for nearly a fifth of Singapore’s total exports, followed closely by the US (17 
percent) and the East Asian economies including Hong Kong (7.9 percent), Japan (7.5 percent) 
and Thailand (4.3 percent). Overall, in 2000, more than half of Singapore’s total exports were 
destined for the ASEAN- plus-Three (or APT) economies (i.e. ASEAN plus Japan, China, and 
Korea) and the US. The shares of most of Singapore’s major trading partners in their total 
exports declined in 2000 compared to 1995, with the exceptions of Australia, China, India, and 
Korea (the first three were relatively unimpacted by the 1997/98 regional crisis). Specifically, 
Singapore’s exports to the large emerging market economies of China and India grew at 
average rates of 19 and 12 percent respectively during the period, which was significantly 
higher than the growth of the city state’s exports to its top five established trading partners. 
China, the Republic’s fastest growing market, increased its share in Singapore’s exports from 
2.3 percent to 3.9 percent during this period, the largest increase in export shares among 
Singapore’s major trading partners. At a subregional level, the share of major ASEAN 
countries in Singapore’s exports declined between 1995 and 2000. 
  The preceding analysis does not distinguish the entrepot component of exports (re-
exports) from the value-added component (domestic exports). Re-exports have, on average, 
constituted between 40 and 60 percent of Singapore’s exports with the exception of North 
American countries (viz. US, Canada) and some East Asian ones (Japan, China and Hong 
Kong). Considering only domestic exports, we note that in 2000, the US remained Singapore’s 
top export market, accounting for nearly a quarter of Singapore’s domestic exports, followed 
by East Asian economies viz. Malaysia (13.5 percent), Japan (8.5 percent), Hong Kong (7.7 
percent) and Thailand (3.4 percent). Overall, as in the case of total exports, more than half of 
Singapore’s total domestic exports went to the APT economies and the US (Figure 4).  
Figure 5 presents Singapore’s total imports from its major trading partners and 
regional groupings for the same period, viz. 1995 and 2000. Japan has consistently been the 




2000, followed by Malaysia (17 percent), the US (15 percent) and other East Asian economies 
including China (5.3 percent), and Thailand (4.3 percent). Overall, nearly half of Singapore’s 
total imports was obtained from the APT grouping, which, unlike the US, has been a much 
more important source of imports than as an export market. In fact, Singapore has been 
running persistent bilateral deficits with Japan which have been increasing both in magnitude 
as well in terms of Singapore’s total trade with Japan, especially during the period 1985-94. 
The deficit was around US$ 12 billion in 2000, constituting about 36 percent of Singapore’s 
bilateral trade with Japan. In contrast, Singapore has recorded a persistent and growing 
bilateral trade balance with the US since the mid 1980s, and amounted to about US$ 4 billion 
in 2000. These surpluses are a relatively low share of overall Singapore-US trade. Continual 
trade deficits with Japan might partly be a reflection of the inability of foreign (including 
Singapore) exporters to penetrate the Japanese market due to the maintenance of both official 
and (especially) unofficial non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (Lawrence, 1987). Indeed, these barriers 
have in turn often led to the accusation that Japan “imports too little” from its trading partners 
(Takeuchi, 1989), with a survey of Singapore exporters in the late 1980s revealing them to be 
“generally overawed by the Japanese ‘closed market' image” (Lim, 1988, p.100). In the context 
of a Singapore-Japan FTA, this factor could be of potential importance, as a bilateral FTA 
ought to provide Singapore preferential access to the Japanese market.  
 
3.  Possible Reasons Behind Singapore Proclivity for Bilateralism 
 
Singapore’s choice of trading partners to form FTAs may be broadly divided into two 
groups. The first group, which includes the US and Japan, are major established trading 
partners. Proposed bilateral trade accords by Singapore with these two economies are best seen 
as a formalisation of the de facto extensive and deep linkages that are already in existence. 
Entering into broad-ranging trade pacts with these two economic superpowers is not only 
viewed as a means of gaining greater market access (with Japan in particular as noted above) 
but also as a way of avoiding the possible imposition of protectionist measures in the future 




orderly dispute settlement mechanisms). Being among the first few countries to establish a 
number of FTAs with these two and other economically significant economies also ensures 
that Singapore is not discriminated ex-post in the event that its “competitors” form FTAs with 
third countries. 
There are further reasons why Singapore’s bilateral trade initiatives with the US and 
Japan are especially noteworthy. While the US has signed a series of bilateral FTAs with 
Canada, Israel, Mexico and Jordan, the announcement of the Singapore-US FTA is the first 
such one that the US may sign with an Asian economy. It has also been suggested that 
Singapore’s bilateral trade accords with the US and New Zealand, along with anticipated ones 
with Australia and Chile, may lead to a Pacific-5 or P-5 FTA, which itself could be a precursor 
to an APEC-wide FTA
4. As noted, Singapore is in the process of negotiating deals with 
Canada and Mexico, the two other members of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA). Could this be a first step in Singapore’s eventual accession into that alliance?  
A possible Singapore-Japan FTA is interpreted by some as an important signal of 
Japan’s weakening adherence to non-discriminatory multilateralism, not unlike the shift in the 
trade policy stance by the US in the 1980s, which led to the global proliferation of regional 
blocs (see Section 5). The consequence of Japan’s shift in sole emphasis on the multilateral 
trading route ought not to be understated. Japan has hitherto been among the staunchest 
multilateralist and has long spurned the FTA route to trade liberalisation. Just a few years ago, 
in response to NAFTA and the possible formation of a Free Trade of the Americas (FTAAs), 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1995) noted: 
(The US) is currently wedded to the wrongheaded approach supporting free 
trade agreements…I believe that Japan and the Far Eastern super performers 
could use..(the)..opportunity to play a leadership role in halting the US slide 
towards its obsessive fixation on free trade agreements and in restoring a 
principal focus on multilateralism at the WTO…Japan and the Asian nations 
have much to offer that is different from and wiser than what the US seeks 
(pp.15-6). 
 
                                                           
4 However, if this is the intention, this, along with APEC’s moratorium on new members, is evidence 
that APEC has forsaken its much-touted but vague principle of “open regionalism” (Schiff et al., 2000 





In addition, rightly or wrongly, the Singapore-Japan FTA has been viewed as a 
precursor to the formation of an East Asia-wide FTA between economies in Southeast Asia 
plus Japan, Korea and China (APT)
5. 
The second group of countries with which Singapore is attempting to formalise trade 
accords, including Australia, New Zealand, the EFTA countries, and the like, individually do 
not account for more than 3 percent of either Singapore’s total exports, domestic exports, or 
total imports. Presumably the aim here is to seek out new markets in view of the seeming loss 
of growth momentum in Singapore’s immediate neighbours. Indeed, valid concerns have been 
expressed that Southeast Asia has lost the dynamism and drive towards trade and investment 
liberalisation and integration (which entails much more than intraregional tariff elimination) 
that it had pre-crisis, and is seen by extra regional foreign investors as the “less attractive 
cousin” of Northeast Asia (Business Times, Singapore, December 11, 2000). It is important for 
Singapore that investors not perceive it as being in the same boat as the rest of the region, i.e. 
Singapore needs to remain on the radar screen of world investors even if Southeast Asia as a 
whole may not be. It has also become apparent that Singapore needs to diversify its economic 
linkages. Conversely, it is plausible that Singapore could act as the “flag-bearer” for the region 
in that its trade initiatives could help maintain global interest and draw extra-regional 
investments into Singapore and the Southeast Asian region as a whole as the crisis-hit 
economies gradually rebuild their financial and economic structures. The surge of recent FTA 
initiatives by Singapore may also be a means of building political momentum for other 
ASEAN/APEC member economies to hasten the process of regional and unilateral 
liberalisation.
 (This is commonly referred to as “competitive liberalisation” whereby modest 
liberalisation induces broader liberalisation). 
 
More generally, FTAs appear to be increasingly regarded by policymakers as effective 
and expeditious instruments for achieving trade liberalisation among “like minded” trading 
                                                           
5 In a recent meeting in Singapore, it was agreed that the APT would explore the possibility of holding 
an East Asian summit as well as consider the establishment of an APT-wide FTA and investment area 




partners (Schiff et al., 2000). Formation of bilateral FTAs among such partners is also seen as 
a way to overcome the so-called “convoy problem”, whereby the “least willing member” 
(“foot-dragger”) holds the pace of trade integration back. Alternatively, as it is sometimes said, 
“those who can run faster should run faster and ought not to not be held back by those who 
choose not to run or do so at a snail’s pace”. While the argument that negotiating regional 
trade pacts are easier to conclude and can be done at a faster pace than global negotiations may 
not hold true as a general rule (Baldwin, 1997 and Bhagwati, 1995), it does seem to be relevant 
in the case of Singapore which sets strict deadlines for completion of discussions (though this 
may come with its own problems; see Section 4). 
Another “first-mover advantage” in forming FTAs with a host of different countries 
early on takes the shape of a “hub” of overlapping arrangements (Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989). 
Producers in the hub have cost advantages vis-à-vis producers in the “spokes”, being able to 
obtain more of their intermediate goods at lower prices. Further, since exports originating from 
Singapore are given preferential access to a number of other markets (with which Singapore 
has trade accords), this may encourage the transshipment of goods through Singapore ports, 
hence fortifying its already dominant role as an entrepot point. Of course, it is for this very 
reason that FTAs stipulate special provisions or rules of origin (ROOs) which are meant to 
prevent goods being re-exported from/circumvented through the lower tariff country to the 
higher tariff one (i.e. trade deflection). However, this in turn may lead to a shift of export 
platforms from other regional developing economies to Singapore in order to gain duty-free 
market access; though care must be taken to ensure that ROOs are not manipulated in such a 
way that partners gain de facto protection for their goods in the Singapore market (see section 
4). 
Trade accords, particularly the recent ones Singapore is involved in (see Table 4), go 
well beyond just merchandise trade liberalisation and also encompass liberalisation of services 
trade and other trade facilitation measures (including investment protection and liberalisation, 
harmonisation and mutual recognition of standards and certification, protection of intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                        




property rights, opening of government procurement markets, streamlining and harmonisation 
of customs procedures, development of dispute settlement procedures, and the like), i.e. so 
called “deep integration” (Lawrence, 1999). As such, FTAs could act as a “testing ground or 
pilot project for exploring complex trade issues” and may help establish some sort of precedent 
or benchmark for trade negotiations involving a larger number of countries, including one at 
the multilateral level (Sager, 1997, p.242). Simultaneously, to the extent that contracting 
parties to an FTA agree to move beyond their respective WTO commitments, there may be a 
demonstration effect that motivates future rounds of broader multilateral negotiations under the 
auspices of the WTO. 
 
4.  Reasons to be Cautious about Whole-heartedly Embracing Bilateralism   
 
It is commonly noted that since Singapore has one of the most liberal trade and 
investment regimes in the world with near zero tariff rates on most goods (and limited non-
tariff barriers), this implies that the scope for trade diversion (i.e. replacement of lower cost 
suppliers from non-member countries) from Singapore’s vantage point is quite small
5. 
Nonetheless, it would be wrong-headed to conclude that there are no ill effects whatsoever. 
What are some potential concerns of Singapore’s recent eagerness to form FTAs?  
  The proliferation of a number of overlapping FTAs raises many technical problems 
with respect to the implementation of ROOs. Even with a single FTA, a concern is that ROOs 
with a particular country, say the US, may be sufficiently prohibitive so as to induce Singapore 
exporters to source their inputs from the US than some other developing country in Asia (such 
as Korea, for instance). In other words, the US exports its external tariffs to Singapore. This 
appears to have been the case with NAFTA, where the US negotiated a ROO on Mexican 
assemblers of automobiles. ROOs also give rise to significant costs due to the need for 
administrative surveillance and implementation. In practice, ROOs are particularly complex - 
they are almost two hundred pages in case of NAFTA and eighty pages of small print in the 
case of the EU’s agreement with Poland - as they have to take into account tariffs on imported 





intermediate goods used in products produced within the FTA. The book-keeping and related 
costs escalate sharply as production gets more integrated internationally (so-called “spaghetti 
bowl” phenomenon) and countries get involved with an increasing number of separate but 
overlapping FTAs.   
Accordingly, Krueger (1997) strongly favors a Customs Union or CU (with members 
have common external tariffs) over FTAs. Note that absent ROOs, a FTA is a de facto CU 
with a common external tariff (CET) equivalent to that of the lowest tariff prevailing in any of 
the member countries If unconstrained, this reduces the effective tariff of every member to that 
of the lowest plus the transportation cost involved in indirect importing (real resource cost). 
With prohibitive ROOs, a FTA becomes a CU where an external tariff is the highest that 
prevails among members. A major disadvantage of CUs is that they require greater degree of 
policy coordination and collective decision-making and budgetary mechanisms to distribute 
the tariff revenue between members
6.  
Apart from the issue of ROOs, a large number of FTAs may leave investors confused 
as to which rules, obligations and incentives correspond to which partner. Worse still, there is 
the possibility that membership in multiple trade accords may create “obligations made in one 
that contradict those made by others” (Schiff et al., 2000). Bergsten (2000) highlights this 
point in the context of compatibility of sub regional arrangements with the APEC’s goals of 
region-wide trade liberalisation (i.e. the Bogor declaration of free and open trade by 
2010/2020). As he notes of the blueprint on the Singapore-Japan proposed FTA: 
it states that Japan is unwilling to liberalize agricultural trade, even in a deal 
with Singapore where there is no agricultural trade. In other words, they do 
not accept the principle. They can argue, as this blueprint does, that it is 
perfectly compatible with the WTO. The WTO says you must substantially 
cover all trade. If there is no agricultural trade, you do not have to include it to 
meet the WTO test. But the APEC test, which was hammered out after much 
debate in both Bogor and Osaka, states that trade liberalisation must be 
comprehensive - no sectors can be excluded. APEC was consciously being 
                                                           
 
6 Schiff et al. (2000), who argue that a “central issue for countries planning to integrate their trade is 
whether to choose and FTA or CU” discuss the issues in some detail. Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1996) 
have suggested a hybrid scheme, i.e. an FTA but without ROOs in two sets of products: one where the 
members agree upon CETs, and the other where all members have low tariffs. Schiff et al. (2000) 
discuss these and other proposals. Panagariya (1999) notes that ROOs could either exacerbate or 




WTO+ and the Japan-Singapore agreement, if that study result becomes the 
actual outcome, would violate its precepts…Moreover, the report says nothing 
about completion by 2010. That deadline is a commitment for countries in the 
APEC context…Japan and Singapore should be asked how their new 
agreement is compatible with APEC (p.5). 
  
  Time and efforts spent on negotiating and implementing a series of bilateral and 
plurilateral FTAs may divert scarce resources from the multilateral trade rounds. Potentially 
more important than the direct impact of this “scarce negotiator resources argument” to 
Singapore is the fact that, by being involved in a number of FTAs, Singapore must accept at 
least partial responsibility for diverting attention of trade partners away from multilateral 
negotiations. For instance, the US Trade Representative (USTR) paying more attention to a 
number of bilateral FTAs may mean that much less attention at the margin being paid to the 
WTO or APEC. 
  Singapore appears to be willing and able to negotiate FTAs with unparalleled rapidity. 
However, this swiftness apparently hinges on the Republic’s readiness to accept a number of 
conditions in the context of the bilateral accords set forth by the larger partners, such as labor 
and environmental standards, in the case of the FTA with the US (said to be modelled after the 
US-Jordan agreement), or exclusion of agriculture in the case of the FTA proposals with Japan 
(as noted by Bergsten above). While acceptance of these conditions may not be problematic in 
the case of Singapore (given its high environmental standards and negligible agricultural sector 
and no farm lobby to speak of), if they are eventually included in the agreements, the city-state 
is not necessarily helping the cause of less well off developing countries in multilateral 
negotiations at large
7. Further, if Singapore unilaterally signs on to such nontrade linkages, 
                                                           
7 Bhagwati’s (1995) discussion of the US FTA strategy during NAFTA negotiations is prescient:   
NAFTA’s passage..was subject to Mexico’s acceptance of supplemental agreements on 
environmental and labor standards…(W)hy should such agreements be a precondition for 
freer trade?..(The) US was a superpower bargaining one-on-one with a vastly inferior 
power. In turn, those supplemental agreements have encouraged the environmental and 
labor lobbies to argue that because NAFTA required them, so must the WTO…In short, 
NAFTA has made the WTO’s business more complex, not less..(T)he United States can 
first force Mexico to buckle under to those demands and then tell Chile and others, “This 
is how NAFTA is, so you must accept these ‘nontrade’ terms and conditions if you wish 
to come on board.”…(T)hat ‘Take-them-one-by-one’ strategy works so much better than 
trying to impose extraneous, indeed harmful, conditions through multilateral trade 
negotiations where all countries facing such demands negotiate together and have more 




might that not preclude ASEAN from taking a common and credible stand on these and other 
issues given the fact that the regional alliance famously follows a policy of consensus? In 
addition, the presence of such linkages could imply that Singapore-based FTAs may be an 
altogether inappropriate model for future trade arrangements and could make the Singapore-
based FTAs de facto exclusionary to other ASEAN members. This, despite repeated 
“assurances” by Singapore policy makers that the FTAs are not exclusive and are open to 
accession by any country which agrees to the terms of the agreement
8. (This is an important 
point taken up in the next section).  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks: Are FTAs Multilateral Friendly or Antagonistic? 
  Singapore’s recent moves to bolster its integration with the global economy via the 
FTA route find a parallel with that of the US in the early 1990s. The US, when faced with 
opposition from the EU and some developing economies during the Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations, decided to liberalise via the preferential trading route rather than the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) or multilateral route via GATT. This was the start of the era of the 
wave of the “new regionalism”
9. The US under trade representative William Brock at that time 
appeared willing to negotiate FTAs with any and all interested parties (including ASEAN) as a 
means of maintaining forward momentum towards trade and investment liberalisation, failing 
which it was feared that there might be a lapse into protectionism, i.e. the so-called “bicycle 
theory”. Singapore’s drive towards FTAs is not solely economic by any means. FTAs could 
also serve as a vehicle by which Singapore draws attention to itself and enhances the city-
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 Paradoxically, as noted, while it may be in Singapore’s best interest to remain as a hub with a number 
of other spokes it may be in the best interests for other countries not to join an existing Singapore-based 
FTA. Wonnacott (1996) cautions that while spokes are certainly worse off in a hub-and-spoke regime 
compared to a “full” or complete FTA, it is unclear as to whether hubs are better or worse off. This is so, 
as the collective income of a hub-and-spoke arrangement tends to be smaller (given the inefficiencies 
caused by overlapping FTAs), the share of benefits accruing to the hub is larger than a full FTA. As is 




9 However, Baldwin (1997) forcefully argues against the commonly held belief that the resurgence in 
regionalism the (so-called “second wave”) was prompted by the conversion of the US from “devoted 
multilateralist to ardent regionalist”. As he further notes, the “US was not multilateralism’s white-knight 
before frustration with the GATT-process in 1982 led it to embrace the Dark side (regionalism). The US 





state’s political recognition and profile with the integrating partners and carves out for itself a 
pivotal role in regional and multilateral trade fora
10. 
Academic and policy interest in bilateral and plurilateral trade arrangements has been 
preoccupied by the question as to whether they are “stumbling” or “building” blocs towards 
multilateral liberalisation. It is clear that the Singapore policymakers are of the opinion that 
FTAs are building blocs and complementary to rules-based multilateralism. There has been a 
concerted attempt to reaffirm the primacy of the multilateral trading system. For instance, the 
Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, has reportedly noted:  
FTAs should not be pursued at the expense of the multilateral trading system. 
We must continue to invest efforts towards the launch of a New Round (of 
multilateral trade negotiations), to ensure that the gap between FTAs and the 
WTO does not grow so wide that it becomes irreconcilable.” (Business Times, 
Singapore, December 5, 2000)
11. 
 
While constant strong support for multilateralism and the WTO as the bedrock of the world’s 
trading system is undoubtedly of importance, the GATT/WTO rules regarding FTAs (which 
are aimed at ensuring that the rights of third parties are not compromised) remain highly vague 
and loose. The wordings of the GATT/WTO rules are open to a variety of interpretations and 
are, for all intents and purposes, ineffective. 
  To be sure, Article XXIV of GATT/WTO that provides for the formation and 
operation of CUs and FTAs covering trade in goods places three principle restrictions on FTA: 
they must not “on the whole” raise protection against non-members; they must reduce internal 
tariffs to zero and must remove “other restrictive regulations of commerce” other than those 
justified by other GATT articles; and should cover “substantially all trade”. Article V of the 
GATS covers the formation of FTAs in the services realm and says essentially the same things. 
The absence of concrete definition of terms and time frames makes almost any preferential 
trade pact compatible with this definition (Hudec and Southwick, 1999 and Panagariya, 1999). 
                                                           
 
10 Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large, Tommy Koh (2000) makes this point convincingly in the context 
of the Singapore-US FTA. 
 
11 Schiff et al. (2000) evaluate the practical implications of the Article and its provisions and make 




Worst of all, there are virtually no multilateral regulations on ROOs that may be imposed by 
FTAs
12. WTO members are however bound to notify the multilateral body of any FTA they 
establish/participate in. Notifications could also refer to the accession of new parties to an 
agreement that already exists. Figure 6 shows the status of notifications of FTAs worldwide. 
There are well over 170 FTAs in force, with intra-RTA trade accounting for almost half of 
overall global trade. Note though that not all the FTAs notified to the WTO are still in force 
today, while recent ones that have just been negotiated are not included (Crawford and Laird, 
2001).  
  The recent multilateral round of negotiations concluded in Doha has failed to make 
any headway in clarifying the multilateral rules of the game as far as regional trade 
arrangements are concerned. All that emanated from the Ministerial statement (available on 
WTO website: www.wto.org) was that negotiations would take place with the aim of clarifying 
and enhancing the existing WTO provisions that apply to FTAs. Thus, key issues pertaining to 
FTAs such as ROOs, sectoral coverage, and the like, has not been addressed. In some senses 
the failure to move forward on this issue is not surprising. Informed observers themselves are 
almost evenly divided about whether FTAs do in fact act as a “stepping stone” to enhanced 
multilateral trade liberalisation (Crawford and Laird, 2001). The current WTO Director 
General, Mike Moore, is inevitably of the opinion that the current trends towards FTAs could 
be problematic to and inconsistent with multilateralism; while the WTO Director General 
Designate, Supachai Panitchpakdi, has, rather surprisingly, come out quite strongly in favour 
of such regionalism, particularly in Asia. The WTO in its Annual Report stated the issues 
involved quite succinctly when it noted: 
The web of overlapping (F)TAs, as well as the intercontinental dimension of 
many new agreements, constitutes not only a departure from the traditional 
concept of regionalism among neighbouring countries, but also a conceptual 
shift away from multilateralism towards trading strategies based on numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Clause” introduced in 1979  (Decision on “Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”) that further relaxes the above provisions. 
12 There do exist some transparency provisions that are included in Annex II of the WTO Agreement on 
Rules of Origin but these are not regulations against ROOs per se. Consequently, this is the area of most 
concern to informed observers, particularly in this era of overlapping hubs and spokes arrangements. 
See the discussion in Section 4 of this paper as well as Krueger (1997), Panagariya (1999), Schiff et al. 




selective preferential agreements comprising no more than two or three parties. 
This could be viewed as a consolidation of trading patterns and a welcome 
development for further trade liberalization across the globe. Alternatively, the 
idiosyncrasy of the agreements, and the growing preference for bilateral (F)TAs 
also suggests a shift to regionalism à la carte, based on the selective choice of 
trading partners and sectors to be liberalized in a preferential – that is, 
discriminatory – way, leading to greater complexity in world trade relations 
(WTO, 2001b, p.88). 
 
What does this all mean to Singapore's international economic policy? In one sense the 
fact that the Doha meeting ended “successfully” with an agreement on the new work 
programme (to be concluded by Jan 1, 2005) suggests that the multilateral route to trade 
liberalisation is “alive and kicking” and should not be complicated by bilateral and sub 
regional trade arrangements. Thus, responsible members of WTO may want to “cease and 
desist” from negotiating FTAs. On the other hand, the fact that not even the slightest progress 
has been made on regulating FTAs, suggests that there is nothing to stop Singapore from 
proceeding along the preferential trading routes. After all, the basic philosophy that guides 
Singapore’s pursuit of such arrangements is that countries that can proceed to liberalise and 
deepen economic linkages at a faster pace should do so. In addition to FTAs with developed 
countries like the US, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, Singapore may also want to work 
more closely with important developing countries in the world either on a bilateral basis or via 
ASEAN to integrate them in the global economy in a market-oriented manner. While some 
Southeast Asian neighbours greeted the initial response to Singapore’s bilateral FTA strategy 
with much scepticism and even irritation, this view seems to have significantly softened. 
Indeed, countries such as Thailand and the Philippines are now looking to emulate the 
Singapore strategy. In addition, a case might be made that Singapore’s go-it-along approach 
helped push ASEAN to seriously explore the possibility of an ASEAN-China FTA and even 
one with Japan.  
An important outstanding issue that remains to be answered is to what extent the 
various bilateral, subregional and transnational arrangements might contradict each other and 
if and how such contradictions will be overcome. Only time will tell. However, one way to 




arrangements are indeed consistent with multilateralism is for them to be accompanied by a 
sunset clause which would require, over time, signatories to the agreement to offer bilateral or 
regional concessions to all non-members on the basis of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. 
In other words, concessions offered by one country to another WTO one should be offered to 
all within a pre-specified timeframe. As Panagariya (1999) notes, this would be the “best 
dynamic time path to bring..(FTAs)..up to multilateral free trade” (also see Srinivasan, 1998). 
While this is ideally something that should be written into the WTO Article of Agreements, 
Singapore could take the lead in this regard and insist it as an inclusion in trade accords which 
it is a signatory to. Singapore ought also to stand firm on requiring its FTAs be comprehensive 
in coverage, not allowing omission of sectors even if these may not be of economic 
significance to the city state (agriculture being a case in point). Exclusion of specific sectors in 
FTAs only perpetuates the problems that exist with multilateral trade liberalisation
13. 
Admittedly, such actions which will further enhance Singapore’s reputation as a highly 
responsible member of the multilateral trading system, may well make the Republic that much 
less attractive to others as a potential FTA partner. A vexing conundrum indeed. 
Lastly, it bears repeating that trade accords nowadays go well beyond trade 
liberalisation, also including “behind the border” impediments to trade and investment flows 
(i.e. trade facilitation measures). This is certainly true of Singapore’s bilateral trade 
arrangements which are often viewed – at least by their own policymakers – as being “trail-
blazing” or “state-of-the-art”. As the recent multilateral trade round illustrated, there is a limit 
to which other developing countries are willing or able to negotiate “new” trade issues 
pertaining to harmonisation of investment and intellectual property rights regimes. Are such 
measures which are invariably more stringent in bilateral accords appropriate for developing 
countries? If not, do not these accords become exclusionary de facto? Thus, while FTAs 
individually may well show an inherent dynamic toward greater liberalisation and open 
markets among like-minded high income countries (Singapore certainly falls in this category), 
                                                           
13 After all, the WTO recently warned in its Annual Report (2001) that the cumulative impacts of all the 
various FTAs that have proliferated worldwide “posed a systemic risk to the rules-based multilateral 




they may also lead to a growing divide between these and developing countries which may see 
the “‘deeper’ integrative aspects of these arrangements as pernicious and undesirable” 
(Lawrence, 1999, p.44). This polarisation of views and actions between developed and some 
developing countries have already threatened to stall multilateral trade negotiations in recent 
years and could well do so in the future. Singapore, as a responsible member of the global 
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Growth Performance of Singapore and Selected East Asian Economies, 1981-2001 
(GDP growth, % per annum) 
 
                           
 Average  Average             
  1981-90 1991-95 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000  2001(p)2002(p)
Singapore  7.3  8.7  7.5 8.0 1.5  5.9  9.9  -2.9  1.2 
Malaysia 6.0  8.7  8.6 7.7  -6.8 6.1  8.3  0.3  2.5 
Thailand 7.9  8.4  5.5  -0.4  -8.0 4.2 4.4  1.5  2.0 
Indonesia 5.4  7.8  8.0 4.6  -13.7 0.8  4.8  3.2  3.5 
Korea  9.1  7.5  7.1 5.5 -5.5 10.9 8.8  2.6  3.2 
Japan 4.0 1.4  3.3  1.9  -1.1  0.7  2.2  -0.4  -1.0 
 
Sources:  IMF, World Economic Outlook, various issues  
 




Annual           Annual  
      percentage         percentage 
Rank Exporters Value Share  change  Rank Importers  Value  Share change 
                               
1    Extra-EU exports  858.9  17.3  7.1  1    United States  1257.6  23.9  18.7 
2    United States  781.1  15.7  11.3  2    Extra-EU imports  965.7  18.3  13.2 
3    Japan  479.2  9.6  14.3  3    Japan  379.5  7.2  21.9 
4    Canada  276.6  5.6  16.0  4    Canada  244.8  4.6  11.2 
5    China  249.3  5.0  27.7  5    China  225.1  4.3  35.8 
6    Hong Kong, China  202.4  4.1  16.1  6    Hong Kong, China  214.2  4.1  18.5 
      domestic exports  23.7  0.5  5.8        retained imports  a  35.4  0.7  23.5 
      re-exports  178.8  3.6  17.6  7    Mexico   182.6  3.5  22.9 
7    Korea  172.3  3.5  19.9  8    Korea  160.5  3.0  34.0 
8    Mexico   166.4  3.3  22.0  9    Taipei, Chinese  140.0  2.7  26.2 
9    Taipei, Chinese  148.3  3.0  22.1  10    Singapore  134.5  2.6  21.1 
10    Singapore  137.9  2.8  20.2        retained imports   75.6  1.4  16.2 
      domestic exports  78.9  1.6  14.8           
       re-exports  59.1  1.2  28.5               
               
        Note:    Data exclude intra-EU trade  
        Source: WTO (2001a)          
      Table 2       
Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade, 2000 
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First Half 2000 First Half 2001 Period 
Figure 2
Comparison of Growth rates of Singapore's Aggregate Merchandise  
Trade over 2000/2001
Non-Oil Domestic  Non-Oil Re- Non-Oil 
Non-oil  Non-Oil Total  Total 
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